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Many states use merit-based judicial selection to limit political influence on
state courts. Under merit selection, an independent, nonpartisan commission
screens candidates for any open judgeship, sending a slate of finalists to the governor. Because the governor may appoint only from these approved finalists, merit
selection constrains the ability of political officials to stack the courts with partisan
judges.
Yet not all are convinced of merit selection’s merit. Critics of merit selection
have assailed the role attorneys play in selecting some of the commission’s members.
Though the details vary by state, ordinarily a minority of commissioners must be
attorneys, and these attorney commissioners are elected by their fellow members of
the state bar. Some argue that, by denying nonattorneys the ability to participate in
these closed elections, merit selection violates the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. In particular, critics point to the vote-denial aspect of the
Supreme Court’s “one person, one vote” principle, which holds that whenever a state
charters an election of a public official who exercises general governmental power,
all qualified voters must be allowed to participate.
This Comment responds to the equal protection challenge to merit selection. It
argues that merit selection is constitutional by way of multiple exceptions, both recognized and implicit, to the “one person, one vote” principle. And though critics of
merit selection often couch their arguments in prodemocratic terms, this Comment
argues that merit selection—like the “one person, one vote” principle—promotes rather than thwarts the will of the people.
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INTRODUCTION
In the United States, judges are generally selected in one of
three ways: (1) at the federal level—and in some states—the executive selects a nominee subject to confirmation by the upper
house of the legislature; (2) in some other states, judges run for
office in contested elections, which may be partisan or nonpartisan;1 (3) most of the remaining states use an alternative system
called merit-based judicial selection. In these merit selection
states, an independent commission accepts applications for any
open judgeship, curating a slate of well-qualified nominees from
which the governor makes the final selection.2 The commission is
1
These elections are contested in the sense that they are open to multiple candidates.
They do not include retention elections, in which an incumbent judge runs unopposed.
2
Two states, Virginia and South Carolina, select judges via legislative election following some form of merit review. See Carl W. Tobias, Reconsidering Virginia Judicial
Selection, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 37, 42 (2008); Kimberly C. Petillo, Note, The Untouchables:
The Impact of South Carolina’s New Judicial Selection System on the South Carolina Supreme Court, 1997–2003, 67 ALB. L. REV. 937, 939–40 (2004). However, the bodies conducting such merit review in Virginia and South Carolina hold less formal power than
many of their analogues in other states. In Virginia, merit-based recommendations are
made by legislative committees that do not winnow the number of candidates to a specific
number. Rather, the committees merely determine whether each candidate nominated by
a state lawmaker is “qualified” for the judgeship sought. See Judicial Selection Overview,
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composed of some combination of sitting judges, attorneys, and
nonattorneys. While nonattorneys are usually appointed to the
commission by the governor, attorneys are often selected in closed
elections in which only members of the state bar association—
that is, other attorneys—may vote.
The constitutionality of appointment-confirmation and judicial election is well settled. But merit selection stands on more
precarious legal footing. Opponents argue that handing attorneys
an enhanced role in the selection of state judges violates the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.3 In particular, they point to the vote-denial aspect of the Supreme
Court’s “one person, one vote” principle. That principle is violated
when a specific subset of voters is denied the ability to vote for a
public official who exercises general governmental power. By barring nonattorneys from participating in the election of attorney
commissioners, merit selection arguably runs afoul of this rule.
Bolstering the critics’ legal challenge is a political one. Given the
liberal bent of the U.S. legal profession, some commentators suggest that merit selection—an ostensibly nonpartisan process—
may promote left-of-center jurists at a disproportionate rate.4 In
recent decades, the movement against merit selection has gained
support. The result has been not only a halt in the expansion of
merit selection to new states but also the modification of meritselection systems in some states that had previously adopted
them.5
In this Comment, I explain why merit selection survives this
constitutional challenge. I use the oldest merit-selection system,
the Missouri Nonpartisan Court Plan,6 as a representative model.
Although merit-selection systems differ from state to state, most
retain the basic structure of the Missouri Plan. If the Missouri
COMMONWEALTH OF VA., DIV. OF LEGIS. SERVS., https://perma.cc/X69C-F7FZ. In South
Carolina, the merit commission has the sole power to nominate judicial candidates, but the
legislature may reject the nominees and begin the process anew. Petillo, supra, at 940–41.
3
See, e.g., Nelson Lund, May Lawyers Be Given the Power to Elect Those Who Choose
Our Judges? “Merit Selection” and Constitutional Law, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1043,
1050 (2011).
4
See, e.g., Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The Politics of Merit Selection, 74 MO. L. REV. 675,
690–703 (2009).
5
See, e.g., David Ferrara, Clark County’s Long Ballot Raises Concerns About Electing
Judges, LAS VEGAS REV.-J. (Nov. 29, 2020), https://perma.cc/KZ4G-NYMU; Dave Boucher,
Amendment 2 to Change Judicial Selection Passes, TENNESSEAN (Nov. 4, 2014),
https://perma.cc/ZHL7-SEKY.
6
Sandra Day O’Connor, The Essentials and Expendables of the Missouri Plan, 74
MO. L. REV. 479, 485 (2009).
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Plan is constitutional, most merit-selection systems are constitutional as well.
Merit selection satisfies three recognized exceptions to the
“one person, one vote” principle—what I refer to as the “specialpurpose,” “appointment,” and “judicial” exceptions. It also satisfies an implicit exception on purposive grounds. The “one person,
one vote” principle was designed to foster fair democratic processes in the selection of members to the political branches of government. Applied to merit selection in a judicial context, the “one
person, one vote” principle is just as likely to hinder democratic
goals as to promote them.
But the constitutionality of merit selection is far from settled.
Although every federal court to consider the issue has declared
merit selection constitutional, only three federal circuits have
weighed in, and the Supreme Court has never decided a meritselection case. The courts that have upheld merit selection have
also differed in their reasoning. The resulting doctrine is conceptually muddled. And in the academic sphere, no author has yet
put forth a comprehensive defense of merit selection that scrutinizes all three recognized exceptions to the “one person, one vote”
principle. This Comment aims to fill that gap and bring certainty
to a cluttered doctrine.
For this issue in particular, certainty is vital. As Alexander
Hamilton opined, courts have “neither Force nor Will, but merely
judgment.”7 They depend on political actors, influenced by the judiciary’s perceived legitimacy, to enforce their decrees. In an era
of declining trust in government institutions, the equal protection
challenge is a loaded weapon. The chance of misfiring may be
slight, but the consequences could be disastrous. This Comment
will help avoid such a result by presenting, for the first time in
the academic literature, a detailed analysis and affirmance of the
various grounds for merit selection’s constitutionality.
This Comment begins in Part I with an overview of the relevant background, including the history and structure of merit selection; the concerns of the anti-merit-selection movement; the origins and subsequent development of the “one person, one vote”
principle; and the federal case law applying the “one person, one
vote” principle to merit selection. Part II analyzes the constitutional questions, concluding that merit selection is subject to a
deferential standard of review and is constitutional by way of both
7

THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 378 (Alexander Hamilton) (Terence Ball ed., 2003).
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recognized and implicit exceptions to the “one person, one vote”
principle. Part III contextualizes the debate over merit selection
as part of a larger dispute about long-term versus short-term
democratic goals. It then explains how merit selection promotes
both judicial independence and accountability. The Comment concludes by explaining the importance of the enduring institution of
merit selection in state courts.
I. BACKGROUND
In this Part, I explain the history and structure of merit selection in the United States. I also examine the movement against
merit selection and provide an overview of the relevant federal
case law.
A. Merit Selection in the United States
Merit selection arose in the mid-twentieth century as an alternative to the then-prevalent systems of appointment-confirmation
and contested judicial elections.8 Since its inception, merit selection
has proven successful in limiting partisan influence and promoting
more ethical judges,9 but the system has drawn controversy for
its unconventional structure.10 Over the decades its luster has
slowly waned, opening the system to rising political and legal
challenges.11 Nevertheless, merit selection remains the most
widely used system for state-level judicial selection.12
1. Progressive reformers and the birth of merit selection.
Missouri was the first state to enact a merit system for selecting state judges.13 In the early twentieth century, progressive
activists grew frustrated with the rampant corruption of state
courts.14 At the time, Missouri judges were elected, not appointed.15 This allowed political bosses, such as the notorious

8
See Rachel Paine Caufield, What Makes Merit Selection Different?, 15 ROGER
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 765, 767–68 (2010).
9
See id. at 789.
10 See infra Part I.A.3.
11 See, e.g., Jay A. Daugherty, The Missouri Non-partisan Court Plan: A Dinosaur on
the Edge of Extinction or a Survivor in a Changing Socio-legal Environment?, 62 MO. L.
REV. 315, 320–22, 327–39 (1997).
12 Fitzpatrick, supra note 4, at 678.
13 Id.
14 See O’Connor, supra note 6, at 484.
15 Id.
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Tom Pendergast of Kansas City, to exert their will on judges facing reelection.16 Judges who delivered rulings favorable to the
Pendergast Machine would receive generous contributions to
their campaigns, while judges with a more independent streak
would often be confronted with well-financed opponents.17
Many viewed merit selection as a way to establish an independent judiciary unbeholden to organized political forces.18 Professor Albert Kales became one of the first academics to propose
such an alternative method of judicial selection.19 The Kales Plan
called for an independent commission to select new judges.20 Inspired by this plan, a group of Missourians developed a system in
which a nonpartisan commission of legal experts and laypeople
evaluates judicial applicants, narrowing the list of candidates
that the governor is allowed to appoint.21 The Missouri Nonpartisan Court Plan (or Missouri Plan, as it would come to be known)
ushered in a new era of judicial selection.
While the merit-selection movement in Missouri grew more
popular among legal professionals and members of the public, it
encountered initial resistance from state lawmakers. Rather than
proceeding through the Missouri General Assembly, proponents
of the Missouri Plan resorted to the initiative-petition process.22
In 1940, Missouri voters approved the Plan in a statewide referendum, thereby enshrining it in the state constitution.23 In response, the General Assembly placed the Plan’s repeal on the ballot for the next general election.24 In 1942, voters chose to retain
the Plan.25 Voters also called for a state constitutional convention,
which convened from 1943 to 1944.26 The convention incorporated
the merit system into its final constitution, which Missourians
ratified in 1945.27 Since then, the Plan has continued to control

16

Id.
See id.
18 See id. at 485.
19 See ALBERT KALES, UNPOPULAR GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 225–51 (1914).
20 Id. at 249–51.
21 James M. Douglas, Judicial Selection and Tenure: “Missouri Plan” Works Well in
Actual Results, 33 A.B.A. J. 1169, 1170–72 (1947).
22 Id. at 1171.
23 O’Connor, supra note 6, at 485.
24 Charles B. Blackmar, Missouri’s Nonpartisan Court Plan from 1942 to 2005, 72
MO. L. REV. 199, 202–03 (2007).
25 Id.
26 Calling Constitutional Conventions—“Missouri’s Best Kept Secret”, MO. SEC’Y OF
STATE (Sept. 1, 2002), https://perma.cc/D3KQ-KDML.
27 Blackmar, supra note 24, at 203.
17
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the state’s process of judicial selection. It remains popular among
the electorate despite continued skepticism from political leaders.28
Following its initial adoption in Missouri, merit selection
spread to other states.29 Dissemination was slow at first, with no
other states adopting merit selection until the late 1950s.30 Then,
from 1958 to 1976, merit selection spread quickly to nineteen
other states.31 Though it is difficult to determine precisely how
many states use merit selection today,32 merit selection appears
to be the most widely used method for selecting state judges.33
2. An overview of the Missouri Plan.
As the first merit-selection system, the Missouri Plan serves
as a national model.34 Although some states have tinkered with the
Plan’s various components—such as increasing the number of commissioners and altering the ratio of attorneys to nonattorneys35—
most states with merit systems have adopted the Plan’s central
framework.36
Under the Missouri Plan, a seven-member Appellate Judicial
Commission accepts applications for any open seat on the Missouri
Supreme Court or the Missouri Court of Appeals.37 The Commission deliberates in private and interviews candidates in an open

28

See infra Part I.A.3.
Karen L. Tokarz, Women Judges and Merit Selection Under the Missouri Plan, 64
WASH. U. L.Q. 903, 909 n.18 (1986) (showing how, by 1968, 72.2% of states had adopted a
merit-selection plan).
30 Diane S. Sykes, Independence v. Accountability: Finding a Balance Amidst the Changing Politics of State-Court Judicial Selection, 92 MARQUETTE L. REV. 341, 346–47 (2008).
31 Id.
32 The difficulty arises from the use of hybrid forms of judicial selection that incorporate merit-like elements. Some states have a commission that is merely advisory, and
others subject commission-selected nominees to legislative confirmation. See How Many
States Elect Judges? With More than 20 Different Selection Systems, That’s a Very Complicated Question., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS. (Nov. 2, 2020), https://perma.cc/TM2N-GX3D.
33 Fitzpatrick, supra note 4, at 678.
34 See MissouriBar, The Missouri Plan - A Model for the Nation, YOUTUBE (Aug. 27,
2014), https://perma.cc/FJL8-85CV.
35 For example, the Arizona Commission on Appellate Court Appointments is composed of sixteen members, only five of whom are attorneys (not including the chief justice
of the Arizona Supreme Court, who serves as chair). ARIZ. CONST. art. VI, § 36(A).
36 See Indiana Merit Selection and the “Missouri Plan”, IND. CT. TIMES (May 2, 2012) (citing Methods of Judicial Selection, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., https://perma.cc/MX5A-6UCU),
https://perma.cc/HQT7-DHD6 (“Currently, thirteen states including Indiana employ
‘Missouri Plan’ merit selection processes for choosing appellate judges. Nine other states
employ merit selection systems with some variations.”).
37 MO. CONST. art. V, § 25(d).
29
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venue.38 It must choose “the three best qualified nominees” to
send to the governor.39 The governor must then appoint one of
those nominees to fill the vacancy within sixty days or else the
Commission is empowered to act in the governor’s stead.40 Once a
newly appointed judge has served for at least one year, the judge
must stand for retention at the next general election, in which a
simple majority of votes grants them a full twelve-year term.41
Judges must stand for retention upon conclusion of each term42
and retire by the age of seventy.43
The Appellate Judicial Commission consists of (1) three
nonattorney citizens appointed by the governor, one from each of
the state’s three appellate court districts; (2) three attorneys
elected by the members of the state bar association in each of the
three appellate court districts; and (3) the sitting chief justice of
the Missouri Supreme Court, who serves as chair.44 No commission member, other than the chief justice, may hold public office,
and no commission member may hold “any official position in a
political party.”45 The six attorney and nonattorney members
serve staggered six-year terms.46 By tradition, the position of chief
justice rotates every two years to a different judge on the sevenmember Missouri Supreme Court, granting each chief justice a
two-year term on the Commission.47

38

MO. SUP. CT. R. 10.28.
MO. SUP. CT. R. 10.27.
40 MO. CONST. art. V, § 25(a). In practice, the governor virtually always makes the final
appointment to avoid surrendering such power to the Commission—even when the governor
is displeased by the Commission’s nominees. See, e.g., Stephen J. Ware, The Missouri Plan
in National Perspective, 74 MO. L. REV. 751, 760 n.37 (2009) (explaining how a Missouri
governor publicly considered refusing to appoint a nominee but ultimately made the
appointment to prevent the choice from reverting to the Commission).
41 MO. CONST. art. V, §§ 19, 25(c)(1). Judges are nearly always retained. In Missouri, no
appellate judge has ever lost a retention election, and voters have denied retention to only four
trial judges. Nonpartisan Court Plan, MO. CTS., https://www.courts.mo.gov/page.jsp?id=297.
42 MO. CONST. art. V, § 25(c)(1).
43 MO. CONST. art. V, § 26.
44 MO. CONST. art. V, § 25(d).
45 MO. CONST. art. V, § 25(d).
46 See MO. SUP. CT. R. 10.03.
47 See Laura Denvir Stith & Jeremy Root, The Missouri Nonpartisan Court Plan: The
Least Political Method of Selecting High Quality Judges, 74 MO. L. REV. 711, 726 (2009).
39
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3. The movement against merit selection.
Many conservative critics of the Missouri Plan object to the
power that attorneys wield in the merit-selection process.48 Their
arguments go like this: Lawyers are not so different from the rest
of us. When members of the bar elect the attorney commissioners,
they do not hang their political ideology at the door; they bring it
with them into the voting booth. Judicial decision-making is infused with political considerations—particularly on appellate
courts, where merit selection is most often used to appoint judges.
Lawyers—intentionally or not—tend to vote for politically likeminded attorney commissioners, who in turn tend to vote for
politically like-minded judicial candidates to forward to the governor.49 Because attorneys are more liberal than the general
population,50 this naturally establishes a liberal bias in the meritselection process.51 Nothing prevents the Commission from sending an entire slate of liberal judges to the governor, who would
be powerless to prevent such an abuse of the system.52 Thus, the
supposedly nonpartisan merit-selection process does not eliminate the politics of judicial selection. It simply moves the politics
to a different level.53
This conservative objection drives many of the efforts against
merit selection. For decades, conservative interest groups and political leaders attacked merit selection primarily through political
means.54 In Missouri, the conservative nonprofit Better Courts for

48 See Clifford Taylor, Without Merit: Why “Merit” Selection is the Wrong Way for
States to Choose Judges, HERITAGE FOUND. (Oct. 6, 2010), https://perma.cc/SME8-HEP5;
Judges, Politics and George Soros, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 31, 2013), https://perma.cc/8WWK
-Q7TK; Jonathan Keim, Our New Trial-Lawyer Overlords, NAT’L REV. (Sept. 15, 2014),
https://perma.cc/Z9AJ-Z3TF.
49 See Fitzpatrick, supra note 4, at 676.
50 See Adam Bonica, Adam S. Chilton & Maya Sen, The Political Ideologies of American Lawyers, 8 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 277, 292 (2016).
51 Professor Brian Fitzpatrick notes that state judges’ voting patterns in primary
elections in Tennessee and Missouri are consistent with the hypothesis that merit selection promotes politically left-leaning judges at a higher rate than other methods of judicial
selection. Fitzpatrick, supra note 4, at 692.
52 See Lund, supra note 3, at 1050.
53 See Fitzpatrick, supra note 4, at 676.
54 See, e.g., Kenyon D. Bunch & Gregory Casey, Political Controversy on Missouri’s
Supreme Court: The Case of Merit vs. Politics, 22 STATE & LOC. GOV’T REV. 5, 6 (1990);
Kurt Erickson, Missouri Senate Leader Seeks Overhaul of Judge Selection Process, ST.
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Mar. 2, 2017), https://perma.cc/4ELT-5SBM. For a complete overview of successful changes to state systems of judicial selection, see History of Reform Efforts:
Formal Changes Since Inception, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., https://perma.cc/44CJ-YZXT.
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Missouri sponsored a 2010 initiative to scrap merit selection,55 but
the proposal failed to collect enough signatures to make the
November ballot.56 In 2012, Missouri Plan opponents made a bit
more headway. A coalition of Republican lawmakers approved
Senate Joint Resolution 51, which put modest alterations to the
merit system up for a statewide referendum.57 These changes
would have granted the governor greater control over the selection process.58 The coalition’s success was short-lived, however, as
voters overwhelmingly rejected the measure.59
Republican officials in Missouri have long voiced doubts about
the Missouri Plan. In 2009, a spokesman for Kenny Hulshof, a former Republican congressman and gubernatorial candidate, said of
merit selection: “A plan that was intended to be nonpartisan
has become very partisan.”60 During the 2016 gubernatorial
campaign, a policy director for future Republican governor Eric
Greitens declared: “Eric is opposed to our current system of judicial selection that gives trial lawyers too much control over the
appointment of the very judges they argue their cases in front
of.”61 The next spring, the president pro tempore of the Missouri
Senate, Ron Richard, echoed the governor’s skepticism. He expressed particular concern over a three-candidate slate recently
approved by the Appellate Judicial Commission.62 Though the sitting governor was himself conservative, the slate contained only
a single candidate with a conservative record, which, in Richard’s
view, effectively diminished the governor’s discretion.63 Though
opposition to merit selection is not always couched in explicitly

For an overview of unsuccessful efforts, see History of Reform Efforts: Unsuccessful Reform
Efforts, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., https://perma.cc/GXK8-B3HM.
55 Jo Mannies, Missouri Bar Lays Out Plans for Defending the State’s JudicialSelection Process, ST. LOUIS PUB. RADIO (Sept. 24, 2009), https://perma.cc/G3H7-K7TH.
56 Marshall Griffin, Mo. Judicial Ballot Question Has Failed, Opponents Say, ST.
LOUIS PUB. RADIO (May 26, 2010), https://perma.cc/WHF2-4RTJ.
57 S.J. Res. 51, 96th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2012).
58 Id.
59 Official Results—General Election, Nov. 6, 2012, MO. SEC’Y OF STATE,
https://enrarchives.sos.mo.gov/enrnet/Default.aspx?eid=750002497 (follow “Submit” hyperlink; then scroll to the bottom of the page to view results for Constitutional Amendment 3).
60 Chris Dunn, Hulshof Proposes Change in Missouri Judicial Appointments,
COLUMBIA MISSOURIAN (Jan. 22, 2009), https://perma.cc/U89E-L55R.
61 Kurt Erickson, Greitens Wants Changes to How Missouri Picks Its Judges, ST.
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Oct. 25, 2016), https://perma.cc/9ULJ-QF79.
62 Erickson, supra note 54.
63 See id.
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conservative terms,64 the bulk of the criticism, in Missouri and
elsewhere, comes from right-of-center groups.
Other states have seen similar movements against merit selection, but merit-selection systems have proven difficult to completely overhaul. For merit-selection opponents, success has usually come from either modifying an existing merit-selection plan
or preventing the adoption of such a plan in the first place. For
example, in 2001, Florida weakened its merit system by granting
the governor the power to select every commission member.65 In
2010, Nevada voters rejected a ballot measure to switch to a
merit-selection system.66 In 2014, Tennessee diluted its merit system by incorporating more traditional appointment-confirmation
elements.67 Although merit selection faces continued attacks, political realities have constrained the wildest ambitions of some of
its opponents.
Having enjoyed only limited success in the political arena,
conservative opponents have turned to the federal courts for relief. The last twenty-six years have seen at least five federal lawsuits claiming that merit selection violates equal protection.68
Although none proved successful, the most recent of the five
challenges came within a single vote of invalidating Kansas’s
method of merit selection.69 In that case, the dissent was heavily
influenced by the burgeoning academic literature in support of
the equal protection challenge. For merit-selection defenders, the
trendline in both law and academia is worrying.
B. The Supreme Court’s Equal Protection Jurisprudence
Developing alongside the merit-selection debate is the federal
judiciary’s own attempt at preserving and enhancing the proper
functioning of certain governmental bodies. Since the 1960s, the

64 Cf. ALICIA BANNON, RETHINKING JUDICIAL SELECTION IN STATE COURTS 17 (2016)
(expressing the liberal-leaning Brennan Center for Justice’s concerns about merit selection, including high-cost and politicized retention elections, “capture” of selection commissions, and failures to create a diverse bench).
65 Rebecca Mae Salokar, D. Jason Berggren & Kathryn A. DePalo, The New Politics of
Judicial Selection in Florida: Merit Selection Redefined, 27 JUST. SYS. J. 123, 125–26 (2006).
66 Official
Results—2010
General
Election,
NEV.
SEC’Y
OF
STATE,
https://perma.cc/BH74-RLLF (follow “STATEWIDE BALLOT RESULTS” hyperlink; then
view results for State Question No. 1); see also Ashley Powers, Nevada to Vote on Appointment of Top Judges, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2010), https://perma.cc/FB9R-TWAA.
67 Boucher, supra note 5.
68 See infra Part I.C.
69 See infra Part I.C.3.
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Supreme Court has slowly developed an equal protection case law
that has expanded the country’s conception of constitutionally
protected voting rights. In particular, the Court derived from the
Equal Protection Clause a “one person, one vote” principle, which
contains both vote-denial and vote-dilution aspects.70 Under the
principle, when the government charters an election of general
interest, it must allow all qualified voters to participate,71 and it
cannot draw malapportioned electoral districts, because doing so
would make some votes worth more than others.72
The Court has wrestled with how to apply this “one person,
one vote” principle to the various democratic mechanisms developed by state and local governments. A jurisprudence has emerged
that balances reasonable governmental experimentation with a
federal floor of constitutionally mandated voting protection.
1. The advent and expansion of “one person, one vote.”
In Baker v. Carr,73 the Supreme Court first developed the
vote-dilution aspect of the “one person, one vote” principle, holding that federal courts have the power to adjudicate electoral malapportionment claims through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause.74 The combination of Tennessee’s antiquated
apportionment law, a boom in urban population, and the failure
of the state legislature to redistrict resulted in wide disparities in
the number of qualified voters residing in each electoral district.75
Prior federal courts had held that legislative apportionment was
a nonjusticiable political question.76 However, the Baker Court,
adopting what would come to be known as the “one person, one
vote” principle,77 departed from precedent in holding the controversy justiciable.78 In a series of subsequent cases, the Court concluded that different types of electoral districts must be roughly
equivalent in population so as not to dilute a voter’s power. The

70

See Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969).
See, e.g., id. at 632–33.
72 See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 581 (1964).
73 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
74 Id. at 209–10.
75 See id. at 192–95.
76 Id. at 208–09.
77 See, e.g., Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963) (“The conception of political
equality . . . can mean only one thing—one person, one vote.”).
78 Baker, 369 U.S. at 209–10.
71
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Court has applied this principle to primary elections,79 congressional districts,80 state legislative districts,81 and local government districts.82
The Supreme Court expanded the “one person, one vote” principle’s vote-denial aspect in Kramer v. Union Free School District
No. 15.83 A New York state law provided that some school-board
elections could be limited to voters who (1) owned or leased taxable property within the school district, (2) were married to someone who owned or leased qualifying property, or (3) had children
enrolled in the district.84 The Court applied strict scrutiny, holding this scheme unconstitutional.85 The Court reasoned that the
school boards’ limited jurisdiction was inconsequential. Under the
Kramer principle, strict scrutiny is applicable where “some resident citizens are permitted to participate and some are not” in an
election for a governmental body that exercises “legislative” as
opposed to “administrative” power.86
The question, then, is what governmental bodies exercise
“legislative” power, thereby triggering the Kramer rule (and the
“one person, one vote” principle more generally). Two cases attempt to clarify this inquiry. In Avery v. Midland County,87 a case
that preceded Kramer, the Court struck down a Texas county’s
use of single-member districts of disproportionate population in
elections of county commissioners.88 At issue was whether the
commissioners exercised “legislative” power, which would place
them within the bounds of the “one person, one vote” principle.89
The Court found that the commissioners indeed exercised legislative power because they were empowered to make “a large number of decisions having a broad range of impacts on all the citizens
of the county,” including setting a tax rate, equalizing assessments, issuing bonds, and preparing and adopting a county
budget.90 The Court thus held that equal protection requires electoral districts be of roughly equal population whenever a local
79
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Gray, 372 U.S. at 381.
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 18 (1964).
Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 562–63.
Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 485–86 (1968).
395 U.S. 621 (1969).
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body exercises “general governmental powers over the entire geographic area served by the body.”91 The Court, however, refrained
from answering whether the “one person, one vote” principle extends to “special-purpose” governmental units, where the units’
functions primarily affect a definable group of constituents.92
The Supreme Court further explained the “general governmental powers” test in Hadley v. Junior College District of Metropolitan
Kansas City.93 In every case in which the Court has applied the
“one person, one vote” principle, the Hadley Court explained, the
“constant factor” has been the decision by government to charter
an election.94 The “purpose[ ]” of the election is immaterial; the
determinative question is whether “a state or local government
[has] decide[d] to select persons by popular election to perform
governmental functions.”95 However, the Hadley Court also recognized that “a State may, in certain cases, limit the right to vote to
a particular group or class of people.”96 Thus, the Kramer principle does not automatically apply to every state-authorized election. “But once a State has decided to use the process of popular
election and ‘once the class of voters is chosen and their qualifications specified, we see no constitutional way by which equality of
voting power may be evaded.’” 97
Thus, Kramer, Avery, and Hadley together stand for the principle that where the government charters an election of an official
who exercises general governmental power, all qualified voters
must be able to participate on equal terms. However, applying the
Kramer rule to the myriad local and state governmental bodies
has not been easy. The Court has found that some elections are of
a substantially different type than the relatively straightforward
contests of Kramer, Avery, and Hadley. The diversity of U.S. electoral systems has necessitated the recognition of a few exceptions
to the Kramer principle.
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Id. at 484–85.
Avery, 390 U.S. at 483–84.
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2. Three recognized exceptions to the Kramer principle.
The Supreme Court has recognized three exceptions to the
Kramer principle. I refer to these as the special-purpose, appointment, and judicial exceptions.
a) The special-purpose exception. The first exception, arising
from Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District98
and Ball v. James,99 allows “special limited purpose” governmental units to limit the franchise to those who are primarily interested in or affected by the units’ activities.100 Thus, the specialpurpose exception has two prongs: (1) the governmental body
must be a “special unit with narrow functions,” and (2) the restricted voting population must bear a “special relationship” to
the function of the governmental body.101
Both cases dealt with water storage districts. In Salyer, the
water storage district existed to acquire, store, and distribute irrigated water to farms within the district.102 The district provided
no other general public services, and it assessed operating costs
against land in proportion to benefits received.103 The district was
governed by an elected board of directors.104 By state statute, only
district landowners, regardless of whether they resided in the district, were eligible to participate in elections of board members.105
In holding this scheme constitutional, the Court concluded
that the Kramer principle was inapplicable for two primary reasons. First, although the district exercised “some typical governmental powers,”106 it had the “special limited purpose” of facilitating irrigation, a primary objective that did not meet Avery’s
“general governmental powers” threshold.107 Second, the district’s
activities had a “disproportionate effect” on the enfranchised

98

410 U.S. 719 (1973).
451 U.S. 355 (1981).
100 Id. at 361; Salyer, 410 U.S. at 728.
101 Bradley v. Work, 916 F. Supp. 1446, 1456–57 (S.D. Ind. 1996) (citing Ball, 451 U.S.
at 361–62).
102 Salyer, 410 U.S. at 723–24.
103 Id. at 724.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 724–25. The landowners’ votes were “apportioned according to the assessed
valuation of the land” owned by each. Id. at 725.
106 Id. at 728.
107 Salyer, 410 U.S. at 728.
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landowners but not the disenfranchised nonlandowners.108 Because Kramer did not apply, the scheme was subject to rational
basis review rather than strict scrutiny.109
In Ball, the Court considered a similar challenge to a water
district that exercised broader power than the one in Salyer.110 As
in Salyer, the district in Ball stored and delivered water to various landowners.111 The district likewise limited voting eligibility
to landowners and apportioned voting power by the amount of
land owned by each.112 But the district also subsidized its water
operations by selling electricity to hundreds of thousands of customers.113 Additionally, the district had the power to condemn
land, sell tax-exempt bonds, and levy taxes on real property.114
Nevertheless, the Court held that this, too, fell short of the
“general governmental powers” threshold.115 The Court reasoned
that—despite its electricity-selling activities, broad geographic
footprint, and wide-ranging influence on the large number of people living within its boundaries—the primary purpose of the district remained the same as that of the district in Salyer.116 The
district simply lacked too many traditional governing capacities
to be considered an exerciser of general governmental powers.117
And, as in Salyer, the district’s primary water-distribution function bore a disproportionate relationship to the specific class of
people whom the system made eligible to vote.118 In sum, because
Ball applied the special-purpose exception to an entity with quite
substantial economic and legal power, it represents a notable expansion of the reasoning in Salyer.
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Ball, 451 U.S. at 362–69.
Id. at 369–70.
Id. at 366:
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b) The appointment exception. The second exception allows appointment of some government officials, even by a private
body, in lieu of an election that complies with the Kramer principle.119 The exception arises from Sailors v. Board of Education120
and Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party.121
Sailors stands for the proposition that not all electoral contests are elections in the Kramer sense; they may be appointments by elected officials, which are automatically exempt from
the Kramer rule. In Sailors, voters elected members of their local
school boards but did not directly elect members of their county
school boards.122 Instead, state law provided that members of
county school boards were chosen by delegates from the local
school boards.123 Each local school board, regardless of the size of its
student population, was apportioned a single delegate to a biennial
meeting at which the county school board would be selected.124
In holding this scheme constitutional, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that the county school board selection was
legally indistinguishable from other instances of electoral malapportionment that the Court had invalidated.125 First, the county
school boards were local bodies that performed “administrative”
as opposed to “legislative” functions, and the “one person, one
vote” principle traditionally had been applied to offices that were
either legislative or that existed at the state level.126 Second, the
Court reasoned that the system in Sailors was not properly construed as an election in the constitutional sense but rather as a
system of appointment.127 The “one person, one vote” principle had
only been applied to elections, and those cases “cast no light on
when a State must provide for the election of local officials.”128 The
Court ultimately held that, “[a]t least as respects nonlegislative
officers, a State can appoint local officials or elect them or combine the elective and appointive systems as was done here.”129
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In Rodriguez, the Court established that the selection process
of an appointing body of a government official does not necessarily
have to comply with the Kramer principle—even if the appointing
body is a private organization.130 The Court upheld a specific
Puerto Rican law that allowed the political party of a deceased
lawmaker to fill the lawmaker’s seat on an interim basis until the
next general election.131 The appointing body was a political party,
which was legally authorized to hold a closed election for the deceased lawmaker’s replacement.132 The election was akin to a
closed party primary in that only registered party members were
allowed to participate.133
In holding that this system did not violate the “one person,
one vote” principle, the Court focused on the interim nature of the
appointment and the law’s party-neutral application.134 All qualified voters had an equal opportunity to participate in the general
election of candidates to the state legislature,135 and the law applied uniformly to all legislative vacancies, whenever they
arose.136 The Court noted that the interim-appointment mechanism allowed vacancies to be filled promptly without the expense
and inconvenience of a special election137 and that the state legislature could have rationally concluded that appointment by the
political party of the incumbent lawmaker would more accurately
reflect the will of the voters than appointment by the governor.138
The Court also concluded that the law was reasonable in light of
Puerto Rico’s special interest in ensuring minority representation
in its legislature.139 In sum, Rodriguez represents the flexibility of
the Kramer principle, which permits reasonable experimentation
by state governments trying to solve particular problems of administering a representative government.
c) The judicial exception. The third exception, arising from
Wells v. Edwards,140 explicitly exempts judicial elections from
equal protection principles. The exception presumably extends to
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other methods of judicial selection, such as merit selection, but its
precedential value is limited.
In Wells, the Supreme Court summarily affirmed a district
court opinion that held that the vote-dilution aspect of the “one
person, one vote” principle was inapplicable to judicial elections.141 That case concerned a challenge to Louisiana’s method of
electing members of the state supreme court. Under the judicial
districting provisions of the Louisiana Constitution, members of
the state supreme court were elected from judicial districts that
were not equal in population.142 The district court reasoned that
the duties of courts were “so far removed from normal governmental activities” that a popular election in compliance with the equal
protection case law was not constitutionally necessary.143 As opposed to legislators and executive officials—to whom the votedilution aspect of the “one person, one vote” principle has been
exclusively applied144—judges “are not representatives in the
same sense” because “[t]heir function is to administer the law, not
to espouse the cause of a particular constituency.”145
The Court revisited this issue in Chisom v. Roemer,146 in
which a class of registered voters challenged Louisiana’s judicial
districting scheme under the Voting Rights Act of 1965. The Court
recognized Wells as holding “the one-person, one-vote rule inapplicable to judicial elections,”147 but it clarified that this did not
insulate judicial elections from vote-dilution claims brought under the Voting Rights Act.148 The Voting Rights Act was “enacted
to protect voting rights that are not adequately protected by the
Constitution itself.”149
Thus, the judicial exception does not have binding precedential force, and the Court has held that elected judges are representatives under the Voting Rights Act, though not necessarily in
141 Wells v. Edwards, 347 F. Supp. 453, 454 (1972) (“[T]he concept of one-man, onevote apportionment does not apply to the judicial branch of the government.”), aff’d mem.
409 U.S. 1096 (1973).
142 Id. at 454, 456.
143 Id. at 454–55 (quoting Hadley, 397 U.S. at 56).
144 Id. at 455.
145 Id. (quoting Stokes v. Fortson, 234 F. Supp. 575, 577 (N.D. Ga. 1964)); see also id.
at 456 (“The State judiciary, unlike the legislature, is not the organ responsible for achieving representative government.” (quoting N.Y. State Ass’n of Trial Laws. v. Rockefeller,
267 F. Supp. 148, 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1967))).
146 501 U.S. 380 (1991).
147 Id. at 402.
148 Id. at 403.
149 Id.
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the equal protection sense.150 However, the scope of the judicial
exception, as presented by the district court in Wells, is quite
broad. The exception seems to categorically exclude all judges
from the “one person, one vote” principle by virtue of their unique
governmental role.
C. How Federal Courts Have Addressed Challenges to Merit
Selection
The Supreme Court has never decided a merit-selection case,
and only three appellate circuits have considered the validity of
merit-selection schemes under the Supreme Court’s equal protection jurisprudence.151 In each case, the court held that merit selection does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. In doing so,
however, the courts employed a panoply of justifications, and their
decisions were not always unanimous. Some relied on one or more
of the three recognized Kramer exceptions, and at least one judge
invoked the idea of an implicit exception.152 But a dissenter on the
Tenth Circuit made a compelling case against Kansas’s method
of merit selection, employing arguments formed in the academic
literature.153 Courts have not settled on a single justification for
merit selection’s constitutionality, and the majority of federal
appellate courts have yet to weigh in. Consequently, the scant
federal case law—although currently one-sided—stands on lessthan-solid conceptual foundations. This Comment will address
that issue in Part II.
1. The Ninth Circuit: Kirk v. Carpeneti.
The Ninth Circuit was the first federal appellate court to consider the equal protection challenge to merit selection. In Kirk v.
Carpeneti,154 the Ninth Circuit upheld Alaska’s system of merit
selection under the appointment exception, but it did not apply
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Id. at 399.
At least one district court has considered the equal protection challenge to merit
selection without review by a higher court. In Bradley v. Work, 916 F. Supp. 1446 (S.D.
Ind. 1996), the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana concluded that
Indiana’s merit-selection system did not violate the Equal Protection Clause or the Voting
Rights Act. On appeal, the equal protection challenge was waived, and the Seventh Circuit
affirmed the district court’s holding regarding the Voting Rights Act. Bradley v. Work, 154
F.3d 704, 711 (7th Cir. 1998).
152 See infra Part I.C.3.
153 See infra Part I.C.3.
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the special-purpose or judicial exceptions.155 However, the Ninth
Circuit’s analysis of the appointment exception is incomplete. Relying on Rodriguez, the court rejected the challengers’ contention
that all appointments must be made by an elected official.156 But
the Ninth Circuit failed to determine what types of appointments
do satisfy the appointment exception; indeed, it did not explain
why merit selection is one of those types.
Kirk is particularly interesting due to the peculiarities of the
Alaska merit system. Under the Alaska system, the composition
of the selection commission is identical to Missouri’s: three attorneys, three nonattorneys, and the chief justice of the state supreme court, who serves as chair.157 However, the attorney commissioners are not elected by members of the state bar. Rather, they
are selected by the Alaska Bar Association’s Board of Governors, a
twelve-member body that is itself selected in a hybrid fashion.158
Nine members of the Board are elected by active members of the
bar association, and three members are nominated by the governor and confirmed by the legislature.159 Therefore, individual
members of the bar association still participate in closed elections
that shape the composition of the merit-selection commission, but
their influence is merely indirect and diluted by the governorappointed members of the Board. This weakening of attorney
power may make the Alaska system less constitutionally problematic than the Missouri Plan.160
In Kirk, a group of Alaska voters sought to enjoin the attorney commissioners from participating in the selection process on
the ground that their presence on the commission violated the
principle of “one person, one vote.”161 The challengers argued that
all participants in the judicial selection process must either be
popularly elected or appointed by a popularly elected official.162
The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument. The court dismissed the judicial exception, relying instead on the appointment
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See id. at 900.
Id. at 898–900.
157 Id. at 891. The governor appoints the nonattorneys (as in Missouri), but the appointments are subject to legislative confirmation (in a departure from the Missouri Plan).
Id. at 893 (citing ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 8).
158 Id. at 893.
159 Kirk, 623 F.3d at 893.
160 See infra note 225.
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exception.163 First, the court interpreted the judicial exception as
standing only for the vote-dilution aspect of the “one person, one
vote” principle; the exception says only that “the Equal Protection
Clause does not require states to distribute judicial election districts according to population.”164 Therefore, it cannot be applied
to merit selection, which is an appointive process with no electoral
districts to apportion.165
Second, the Ninth Circuit addressed the appointment exception. The court emphasized the professional—rather than personal—role of the attorney commissioners as representatives of
the bar,166 concluding that “the right to equal voting participation
has no application to the Judicial Council because the members
of the [selection commission] are appointed, rather than elected.”167
The court then considered the plaintiffs’ argument that “all participants in Alaska’s judicial selection process must either be elected
themselves, or be appointed by a popularly elected official.”168 The
court rejected this argument based on Rodriguez, which declared
valid an interim appointment of a state legislator by a political
party.169 The court concluded that even if the plaintiffs’ principle
were correct, there would be no violation of it here because the
“ultimate power to appoint judges is in the Governor, who is popularly elected by the people of Alaska” and “the people have the
opportunity to reject the appointment in subsequent retention
elections.”170
In this analysis, the Ninth Circuit failed to assess the scope
of the appointment exception, including whether it applies to any
type of appointment or only to certain types of appointments. The
Ninth Circuit correctly concluded that Rodriguez stands for the
proposition that not every appointment under the appointment
exception must be made by an elected official, but that does not
necessarily mean an appointment under the exception may be
made by any group or individual.171 Because of the limited scope
of the Ninth Circuit’s opinion, the court failed to make a full defense of merit selection.
163
164
165
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2. The Eighth Circuit: Carlson v. Wiggins.
The Eighth Circuit first addressed the equal protection challenge in African-American Voting Rights Legal Defense Fund, Inc.
v. Missouri,172 in which it affirmed, without opinion, a district
court’s decision to uphold Missouri’s system of merit selection.173
The Eighth Circuit did not fully address the equal protection challenge until fourteen years later. In Carlson v. Wiggins,174 the
Eighth Circuit affirmed a district court’s validation of Iowa’s
method of merit selection.175 Iowa’s system is similar to Missouri’s
but with a larger commission. The Iowa commission is composed
of fifteen members: seven nonattorneys appointed by the governor and confirmed by the state senate, seven attorneys elected by
members of the bar, and a judge of the state supreme court, who
serves as chair.176
As opposed to the Ninth Circuit, which relied on the appointment exception, the Eighth Circuit relied on the special-purpose
exception. It concluded that the selection commission does not exercise general governmental power because the governor makes
the final judicial appointment.177 The court also concluded that
the commission’s work in winnowing the field of judicial candidates has a special effect on members of the state bar, a definable
group of constituents.178 Therefore, the election of attorney commission members was considered an election of special interest,
subject only to rational basis review.179
3. The Tenth Circuit: Dool v. Burke.
The Tenth Circuit is the most recent federal circuit to address
the constitutionality of merit selection. In Dool v. Burke,180 the
Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of an equal
protection challenge to Kansas’s method of merit selection.181 The
court, however, was split in its reasoning. Each member of the
three-judge panel filed a separate opinion, including one dissent.
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Dool represents the federal judiciary’s inability to settle on a singular justification for merit selection’s constitutionality.
The Kansas commission operates more like those of Missouri
and Iowa than that of Alaska, as the attorney members are
elected by the members of the state bar association, not appointed
by the state bar’s governing body.182 One small difference is the
makeup of the commission. The Kansas commission has nine members: four nonattorneys selected by the governor and five attorneys
elected by members of the Kansas bar.183 Unlike in most meritselection states, bar-elected attorneys are a majority on the Kansas
commission. This potentially makes the Kansas system more constitutionally suspect.184
In his concurring opinion, Judge Terrence O’Brien eschewed
all three recognized Kramer exceptions,185 concluding instead that
the “one person, one vote” principle does not apply to merit selection by way of an implicit exception. Judge O’Brien reasoned that
the “strict demands” of the “one person, one vote” principle “cannot reasonably apply to every election unable to be wedged into
the fact-bound and exceedingly narrow exception established in
Salyer and Ball.”186 The “general governmental powers” qualifying language of Avery, Hadley, and other cases implies there are
bodies—beyond those that satisfy both prongs of the specialpurpose exception—to which “one person, one vote” would not apply by virtue of their limited or nongovernmental function.187 To
Judge O’Brien, this implicit exception is a threshold inquiry. Before applying any exceptions to the “one person, one vote” principle, a court must ask whether the body in question exercises general governmental functions.188
A merit-selection commission does not pass this threshold,
Judge O’Brien concluded. A body that exercises general governmental functions must, by its actions, “have a direct and immediate effect on voters.”189 It must also have “general” governmental
power and exercise it “over” the geographic area served by the
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184 See infra note 225.
185 Judge O’Brien rejected the special-purpose exception for the reasons mentioned
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body so that its activities have a “sufficient impact” on the electorate.190 The commission, “which can neither make law nor administer it, plainly has no such general power.”191 Its sole function—winnowing the list of judicial candidates sent to the
governor—“is not a traditional government function.” If anything,
the commission serves as a structural check on such government
functions, as it is designed to ensure the executive cannot use the
appointment power to threaten the integrity of the judicial
branch.192 Further, the democratic principles that compelled the
“one person, one vote” line of cases do not apply to a merit-selection
commission because the legitimacy of the commission’s work is
not contingent upon the popular election of its members.193
In his concurring opinion, Judge Scott Matheson concluded
that the Kansas system of merit selection falls within the specialpurpose exception to Kramer.194 Judge Matheson employed both
prongs of the special-purpose exception. He reasoned that the selection commission performs the special, limited purpose of screening judicial candidates, and that its work disproportionately affects
attorneys because only attorneys are eligible to serve as judges on
a Kansas appellate court.195 Judge Matheson considered Judge
O’Brien’s notion of an implicit exception—the idea that the “one
person, one vote” framework does not apply at all.196 He concluded, however, that the “one person, one vote” framework and
the special-purpose exception were perfectly administrable in this
case without resorting to an implicit exception.197
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Monroe McKay concluded
that because the special-purpose exception does not apply to
merit selection, merit selection must be subject to strict scrutiny,
which it cannot survive.198 Judge McKay reasoned that judicial
selection impacts the general population, so the selection process’s
specific impact on attorneys cannot trigger the special-purpose
exception.199 This takes merit selection out of the reasoning of
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Salyer and Ball, he argued, where the “end impact was on discrete
groups” and the “general public was only nominally impacted.”200
By eliminating all but a few candidates from consideration, the
commission exerts significant power over who becomes a judge.
This makes its nominations functionally equivalent to the winnowing mechanism of a political party primary or election of presidential electors—processes to which the Supreme Court has held
that strict scrutiny applies.201
Judge McKay reasoned that the governor’s role in making the
final appointment does not save merit selection’s constitutionality because the governor’s choice is severely constrained and subject to manipulation by the commission.202 The governor must still
select one of the commission’s approved candidates, even if the
governor finds all three unacceptable.203 Judge McKay concluded
that “[b]y delegating to the state’s lawyers the authority to elect
a controlling majority of a body that exercises almost all of the
discretion involved in appointing supreme court justices, Kansas
has virtually given the state bar the authority to elect those who
choose the justices.”204 As such, Judge McKay would have found that
strict scrutiny applied and that the system was unconstitutional.205
The main takeaway from Dool is how little it truly resolved.
The Tenth Circuit upheld merit selection’s constitutionality, but
the exact reason why merit selection is constitutional remains unclear. Dool, and the federal cases that preceded it, represent a
growing dissension in the federal judiciary’s handling of meritselection cases.
II. MERIT SELECTION IS CONSTITUTIONAL BY MANY ROUTES
Although many scholars have discussed the history and policy implications of merit selection, only a few pieces of legal scholarship focus on the equal protection challenge. Nearly all of these
pieces argue that merit-selection processes potentially violate the
Equal Protection Clause.206 In particular, an essay by Professor
200

Id. at 794.
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Nelson Lund presents what is perhaps the most comprehensive
argument in favor of the equal protection challenge.207 Only one
piece, a student note by Cort VanOstran, defends merit selection
against these critiques.208
Part II of this Comment serves as a reply to Lund and an expansion of the arguments formed by VanOstran. Lund argues
that merit selection’s closed elections are analogous to the restricted school board elections in Kramer because they disenfranchise otherwise qualified voters.209 They cannot be distinguished
by their indirect effect on judicial selection due to the substantial
power the bar wields in the process.210 Merit selection is thus subject to strict scrutiny, which it cannot survive.211 Lund then analyzes each of the recognized exceptions to the “one person, one
vote” principle, concluding that none apply to merit selection.212
VanOstran, however, adopts the reasoning of Judge O’Brien’s
concurrence in Dool, arguing in favor of an implicit exception.213
Because VanOstran avoids any analysis of the three recognized
exceptions, he leaves many of Lund’s arguments unchallenged.
In continuing the conversation between these two pieces,
Part II.A first addresses the overarching question of whether
merit selection infringes a fundamental right, which would trigger strict scrutiny. It also addresses the related question of
whether the indirect effect of the attorney elections on judicial
selection takes them outside of the Kramer rule. Part II.B then
analyzes each of the recognized exceptions, concluding that all
three apply to merit selection. Finally, Part II.C explores the idea
of an implicit exception, bolstering VanOstran’s arguments with
additional support.

J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 392, 398 n.34 (2009) (explaining that the sort of favoritism merit selection affords attorneys was found to violate equal protection in the context of a different
occupation). See generally Joshua Ney, Note, Does the Kansas Supreme Court Selection
Process Violate the One Person, One Vote Doctrine?, 49 WASHBURN L.J. 143 (2009) (explaining that a strong argument exists for the invalidity of the Kansas system of merit selection
under an equal protection analysis).
207 See generally Lund, supra note 3.
208 See generally Cort A. VanOstran, Note, Justice Not for Sale: A Constitutional Defense of the Missouri Plan for Judicial Selection, 44 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 159 (2014).
209 See Lund, supra note 3, at 1049.
210 Id. at 1049–50.
211 Id. at 1050, 1067–68.
212 Id. at 1050–60.
213 VanOstran, supra note 208, at 175.

280

The University of Chicago Law Review

[89:1

A. Merit Selection Does Not Infringe a Fundamental Right
One of the first issues in any equal protection claim is the
applicable standard of review. With some exceptions, courts apply
either rational basis review or strict scrutiny.214 This Comment
assumes that merit selection satisfies rational basis review but
falls short under strict scrutiny. Strict scrutiny is applied whenever a law infringes a fundamental right or involves a suspect
classification.215 In the case of merit selection, the issue is whether
nonattorneys are unconstitutionally disenfranchised by their inability to participate in elections of attorney commissioners.
Nonattorneys are not a suspect class,216 so the question of whether
merit selection should be subject to strict scrutiny hinges on
whether these closed elections infringe a fundamental right. The
three recognized exceptions involve cases where the Supreme
Court has concluded that no fundamental right is infringed and
thus that strict scrutiny does not apply. This Section addresses
the abstract question of whether merit selection infringes a fundamental right, while Part II.B addresses whether the recognized
exceptions apply to merit selection.
The Constitution does not protect a per se right to vote.217 Rather, through the Fourteenth Amendment, it establishes the right
to equal protection.218 Voters have “the protected right, implicit in
our constitutional system, to participate in state elections on an
equal basis with other qualified voters whenever the State has
adopted an elective process for determining who will represent
any segment of the State’s population.”219 The Supreme Court has
recognized as a “fundamental” right the ability to have one’s vote

214 Aside from gender-discrimination cases, intermediate scrutiny is uncommon in the
equal protection context. Amanda Mayo, Comment, Nonresident Vote Dilution Claims: Rational Basis or Strict Scrutiny Review?, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 2213, 2214 n.7 (2016). Courts
will sometimes use a term other than “strict scrutiny” to refer to the same concept. See,
e.g., Kramer, 395 U.S. at 626 (“close scrutiny”); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265, 291 (1978) (“the most exacting judicial examination”).
215 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16 (1973).
216 See Mahoney v. Doerhoff Surgical Servs., Inc., 807 S.W.2d 503, 512 (Mo. 1991); cf.
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 28 (stating that a suspect class is traditionally
defined as one being “saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to
command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process”).
217 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 35 n.78.
218 “No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
219 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 35 n.78.
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be counted on equal grounds with those of other citizens.220 Such
equal suffrage, the Court has said, is fundamental because it “is
preservative of other basic civil and political rights.”221
But this raises the following question: For which elections is
the equal protection of one’s vote a fundamental right? The Court
has held that equal protection principles apply to a wide range
of elections for legislative and executive offices.222 But unlike a
legislator or governor, an attorney elected to a merit-selection commission does not directly exercise general governmental power of
the type at issue in the Kramer line of cases. The attorney commissioner merely plays a limited role in the selection of an official
who herself exercises general governmental power. It is not at all
clear that denying nonattorneys the right to vote for attorney members of merit-selection commissions infringes a fundamental right.
Lund argues that the Court has applied strict scrutiny to
electoral mediating institutions, such as political party primaries
and presidential elections, and so strict scrutiny should also be
applied to merit selection.223 Political primaries determine which
candidate a party will run as its nominee in a general election,
while presidential elections determine the slate of electors a state
sends to the Electoral College. Lund argues that a merit-selection
commission is a similar mediating institution because it effectively controls the selection of judges and can even abuse the process to ensure the governor selects its preferred candidate.224
However, elections of attorney members to merit-selection
commissions are different than elections to those other mediating
institutions in three relevant respects. The attorney commissioners
are constrained on all sides by processes whose constitutionality
is not in question. First, the attorney commissioners do not compose the entirety of the commission. In Missouri, as in most meritselection states, they form a sizeable minority—three-sevenths of
the commission.225 Their exercise of power is thus constrained by
220

Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561–62 (1964).
Id.
222 See supra Part I.B.1.
223 Lund, supra note 3, at 1053–54.
224 Id. at 1049–50.
225 The diluted power of the attorney commissioners’ votes may itself hold constitutional significance. The attorney commissioners’ role could be analogized to that of automatic delegates (also known as superdelegates) to the Democratic National Convention.
Superdelegates are party dignitaries automatically seated as delegates to the party convention, thereby giving each superdelegate an outsize influence (as compared to each individual primary voter) on the ultimate selection of the Democratic Party’s presidential
nominee. In the past, superdelegates have comprised about 15% of the total delegates to
221
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the other commissioners, whose positions on the commission raise
no clear equal protection concerns because they are either appointed by an elected official or are an official themselves. Second,
states employing the Missouri Plan require each newly appointed
judge to stand for retention shortly after taking office. The attorney commissioners’ exercise of power is thus also directly checked
by voters who must (following a brief probationary period) either
formally approve or disapprove of each judge appointed by the governor from the commission’s approved slate. As these retention
elections are open to all qualified voters, there is, again, no equal
protection violation. And third, merit-selection commissions are
called upon to evaluate the candidates’ judicial acumen independent of policy preferences,226 whereas voters in party primaries
and presidential elections are unconstrained by this legal and
professional duty.
Additionally, while it is true that federal courts have applied
the “one person, one vote” principle to primary elections, federal
courts generally recognize the constitutionality of closed primaries, in which only registered party members may vote.227 Therefore, political parties—perhaps the most consequential electoral
mediating institutions in the U.S. political system—are not obligated to extend the right to vote in a primary election to all eligible voters. The “one person, one vote” principle allows a mediating
institution to, in at least some circumstances, impose voter qualifications at an incipient stage in the larger selection process. The

the Democratic National Convention. See Drew DeSilver, Who are the Democratic Superdelegates?, PEW RSCH. CTR. (May 5, 2016), https://perma.cc/D526-PJGJ. Although the federal courts have held that the “one person, one vote” principle is applicable to primary
elections, it appears no federal court has ever declared that the Democratic Party’s use of
superdelegates is unconstitutional. See, e.g., Kurzon v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 197 F.
Supp. 3d 638, 644 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (declining to issue preliminary injunction against the
use of superdelegates).
226 See MO. SUP. CT. R. 10.27 (“Each commission shall select the three best qualified
nominees.”). Some are skeptical “that state bar associations are less inclined to examine
the personal ideological preferences of judicial candidates than are voters or elected officials.” Fitzpatrick, supra note 4, at 676. But a process that ostensibly values its nonpartisan character provides an informal safeguard against political intrusion. While the
strength of this safeguard is debatable, it should not be completely ignored. There is general agreement that merit-selection commissions should not act in an overtly partisan
form. Even if commissioners do not take this mandate seriously, the legitimacy of their
work depends on maintaining a perception of nonpartisanship. The same cannot be said
for political leaders, political parties, and voters in partisan elections.
227 Cf. Rodriguez, 457 U.S. at 14 (“The Party . . . was not required to include nonmembers in what can be analogized to a party primary election.”).
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right to an equally protected vote, therefore, is not always fundamental at such an early phase—even if the process goes on to select a general government official. Even in the abstract, it is clear
that merit selection does not infringe a fundamental right and
therefore does not trigger strict scrutiny.
B. All Three Recognized Kramer Exceptions Apply to Merit
Selection
Determining the proper standard of review is an abstract
question, but explicit doctrinal exceptions aid the analysis. The
Supreme Court has, to date, recognized three exceptions to the
Kramer principle. In these cases, the Court determined that rational basis review, rather than strict scrutiny, applied. Although
none is a perfect fit, each exception covers merit selection.
1. The special-purpose exception.
Merit-selection commissions represent “special limited purpose” governmental units of the type at issue in Salyer and Ball
due to their narrow, technical duties, which hold specific implications for attorneys. The commissions have little power beyond
their function as screeners of judicial candidates. The commissions generally have no support staff, and their members are not
salaried,228 indicating a lack of general governmental power. They
cannot act until a court vacancy arises, and, even then, their authority is narrowly constrained. The commissions exist only to assess the
merit of would-be judges—a task that, by their carefully crafted
membership structure, they are well situated to complete. Lay
citizens, sitting judges, and licensed attorneys each bring useful
knowledge and perspective to the judicial-selection process. And
although the decisions of appellate courts may affect the daily lives
of people living under those courts’ jurisdictions, those are judicial
decisions, not decisions of the selection commission.
A merit-selection commission satisfies the first prong of the
special-purpose exception because it has the limited duty of evaluating judicial candidates using merit-based criteria. This is apparent from the structure of the commission’s membership, which is
carefully designed to facilitate such evaluation. Using the Missouri
Plan as an example, we see that the commission is constructed as

228

VanOstran, supra note 208, at 176.
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a middle ground between the legal and the political—a sort of arbitration-like system that balances, at least at this initial stage of
the selection process, the expertise of the legal profession and the
interests of the populace writ large. The three lay citizens (selected by the popularly elected governor) represent the people,
while the attorney members (selected by the bar association
through closed elections) represent the expertise of the legal profession. The chief justice, who serves as chair, represents the institutional expertise of the judiciary itself. The commission is designed to balance legal expertise with political interests, not to
make general public policy.
The driving idea behind this structure is that a small body
composed of legal professionals and lay citizens will be better able
to assess the juridical merit of the candidates that come before it
than would a popular electorate or a chief executive. By court
rule, the commissioners are obligated to “select the three best
qualified nominees.”229 Underlying this idea is the premise that
legal reasoning and judicial capacity are professional skills that,
like those of other professions, can be developed through intensive
educational and vocational training and where a minimum level
of acceptable competency is evidenced through a formal licensing
procedure. The task of assessing legal merit is best performed by
those with a particular understanding of the practice of law,
which is wisely counterbalanced by the political perspectives of
the lay commissioners. One level down, legal knowledge is also an
asset in the selection of the attorney commission members. A
closed election of licensed attorneys is a reasonable way to facilitate legal merit within the process of selecting members to a
merit-selection commission—and the selection of which attorneys
represent the legal profession is of greater concern to attorneys
than to nonattorneys.
These fine-tuned commissions do not exercise the type of general governmental power that would mandate application of the
“one person, one vote” principle.230 Even to the extent that the
commission does influence judicial selection, the courts do not recognize that such indirect and partial influence over the selection
of an official is itself an exercise of that official’s power. The water
district in Ball had a substantial effect on the hundreds of thousands of Arizonans to whom it sold electricity.231 Yet because this
229
230
231

MO. SUP. CT. R. 10.27.
Bradley v. Work, 916 F. Supp. 1446, 1456–57 (S.D. Ind. 1996).
Ball, 451 U.S. at 357.
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effect was only incidental to the water district’s primary function—maintaining and distributing water within the district—it
did not constitute an exercise of general governmental power.232
The question, then, is whether the merit-selection commissions
themselves exercise general governmental power. In applying the
standard articulated in Ball, Avery, and Hadley, merit-selection
commissions fall short of this threshold. The commissions do not
exercise any of the prototypical government functions listed by
the Ball Court:233 They cannot levy taxes or enact laws that govern citizens’ conduct. Nor do they maintain streets, operate
schools, or administer sanitation, health, or welfare services.
Their power is less substantial than that of the water district in
Ball, which could condemn land, sell tax-exempt bonds, and levy
taxes on real property.234 The commissions do not “serve” any geographic area, let alone exercise “general governmental powers
over the entire geographic area” that they serve, thereby falling
outside the language of Avery.235 Even if the power of the commissions can be said to have “sufficient impact” throughout the state,
Hadley says that the commissions’ power must also be “general”236—a descriptor that does not fit the narrow duty of vetting
judicial candidates. Therefore, the commissions meet the first
prong of the special-purpose exception.
A merit-selection commission satisfies the second prong of
the special-purpose exception because the commission’s work has
a disproportionate impact on, or special relationship to, attorneys
throughout the state. Here, the correct framing is not whether the
work of judges has a disproportionate impact on attorneys,237 but
whether the work of winnowing the pool of judicial candidates has
such an impact. That is the work conducted by a merit-selection

232

See id. at 368–69.
See id. at 366.
234 Id. at 360.
235 See Avery, 390 U.S. at 485.
236 See Hadley, 397 U.S. at 53–54.
237 The work of judges arguably does have a disproportionate impact on attorneys, even
though such a conclusion is not required for merit selection to satisfy the second prong of the
special-purpose exception. All citizens, attorneys and nonattorneys alike, are equal before
the law. But judges are also authority figures within the legal profession itself. State courts
possess rulemaking and disciplinary powers that directly bear on an attorney’s professional
livelihood. See, e.g., The Attorney Discipline Process in Missouri, MO. BAR (Jan. 1, 2020),
https://news.mobar.org/the-attorney-discipline-process-in-missouri. Attorneys are affected by
both the judicial and professional powers of courts, whereas nonattorneys are only affected by
the former.
233
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commission. With the inquiry properly stated, it is clear that attorneys have a “special relationship” to the commission’s work.238 As
legal practitioners, attorneys are uniquely suited to assess the
qualifications of aspiring judges, whose job it will be to hear legal
disputes and apply the law in a specific jurisdiction. And who better to select the best reviewers of legal merit than an attorney’s
own peers?
Additionally, in Missouri, as in most states, only licensed
attorneys may become state judges.239 Even where this is not a
formal requirement, attorneys are disproportionately selected to
serve as state judges. Merit-selection commissions either exclusively or predominantly evaluate attorneys. Attorney commissioners evaluate would-be judges and, in doing so, engage in selfpolicing—a quasi-professional function—by determining who they
believe is best among them to assume an open spot on the bench.
This role is not so different from that of the Alaska Bar Association’s
Board of Governors, which evaluated and policed attorneys through
“admission, discipline, licensing, continuing legal education, specialization, and defining the practice of law.”240 From these limited
powers that disproportionately affect attorneys, the Kirk district
court correctly concluded that the Board was a special, limitedpurpose entity.241 Because attorney members of a merit-selection
commission perform similar work in policing and evaluating their
fellow attorneys, their work also satisfies the special-impact
prong of the special-purpose exception.
2. The appointment exception.
Merit-selection commissions fall within the appointment exception because each stage of the selection process is an appointment, not an election, and these appointments are all valid under
Sailors and Rodriguez.242 Under these cases, some appointments
are exempted from equal protection concerns: all appointments
by an elected official and, as demonstrated by Rodriguez, at least
some appointments not by an elected official.243 Rodriguez allowed
238

See Ball, 451 U.S. at 357.
MO. CONST. art. V, § 21.
240 Miller v. Carpeneti, No. 00136, 2009 WL 10695976, at *9 (D. Alaska Sept. 15, 2009).
241 Id.
242 Some scholars divide the appointment exception into two separate exceptions: one
derived from Sailors, the other derived from Rodriguez. See, e.g., Lund, supra note 3, at
1050, 1054–58. I think it is more useful to treat these cases as two applications of the same
appointments-based exception.
243 See Rodriguez, 457 U.S. at 14.
239
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a political party to appoint a replacement lawmaker for a vacant
legislative seat. The appointments within the merit-selection process are either by an elected official or fall within the Rodriguez
rule because they serve similar democratic interests. Specifically,
both the appointment in Rodriguez and the appointment of attorney commissioners on a merit-selection commission facilitate the
general will of the voters on an exclusively interim basis.
a) Each stage of the merit-selection process is an appointment, not an election. In upholding a system of appointment of
county school boards by delegates from local school boards, the
Sailors Court recognized that systems having the outward appearance of an election are not necessarily elections of the type
regulated by the “one person, one vote” principle.244
Merit selection falls within this category. It may at certain
steps appear electoral, but it is not in substance. In assessing the
applicability of the appointment exception, it is useful to break
merit selection into its component parts. In merit selection, there
are three steps that are appointments in the Sailors sense: (1) the
selection of attorney commission members, (2) the selection of the
three candidates sent to the governor, and (3) the governor’s final
selection. There is no electoral step—it is appointments all the
way down.
The selection of attorney commissioners is not a general election in the doctrinal sense. It is an appointive process of the state
bar membership with a state constitutional mandate that the appointment be decided by way of a closed election. Tellingly, some
merit-selection states, like Alaska,245 assign the selection of attorney commissioners to the state bar association but do not mandate that the state bar hold a closed election. There is no reason
why there should be a constitutional difference between an appointment made by the leadership of the bar and an appointment
made by the membership of the bar, even where a state constitutional provision dictates which of the two processes must be conducted. Both serve the same function—declaring the will of the
bar association (or the subset of its membership in each appellate
district). As with the internal election in Rodriguez, if a multimember entity is authorized to make an appointment, an internal
process that is electoral does not render the collective decision of
the entity nonappointive.246
244
245
246

Sailors, 387 U.S. at 108.
See supra Part I.C.1.
See Rodriguez, 457 U.S. at 14.
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That leaves the commission’s selection of the three-candidate
slate—obviously an appointment, not an election—and the governor’s final selection. Lund argues that the governor’s role in the
selection process is too tightly constrained to count as a valid exercise of appointment by an elected official:
The Sailors Court was careful to note that a “State cannot of
course manipulate its political subdivisions so as to defeat a
federally protected right . . . . Nor can the restraints imposed
by the Constitution on the States be circumvented by local
bodies to whom the State delegates authority.” That is exactly
what Kansas appears to have done. By delegating to the
state’s lawyers the authority to elect a controlling majority of
a body that exercises almost all of the discretion involved in
appointing supreme court justices, Kansas has virtually
given the state bar the authority to elect those who choose
the justices. The State’s choice of a complex procedure that
obscures that effect cannot alter the reality of the effect.247
It is important to contextualize Lund’s argument—which focuses on the Kansas system, an outlier in terms of the higher proportion of attorneys on its commission. Unlike a commission that
follows the more common Missouri Plan, the Kansas Supreme
Court Nominating Commission gives attorneys a majority of the
commission seats. Five of the nine members of the Kansas commission are elected by the bar.248 The Missouri attorneys, therefore,
exercise less power as a voting block than their counterparts in
Kansas. Lund’s central point, however, still applies to the Missouri
Plan: the attorney commissioners, to at least some extent, constrain the governor’s appointive discretion. But this feature is not
as constitutionally problematic as Lund makes it appear. And it
does not defeat the essential appointive nature of the governor’s
selection.
Regardless of the exact composition of the commission, Lund
severely undervalues the governor’s role. The governor not only
has the final power of appointment but also exercises significant
power over the commission itself by appointing a sizeable minority
of its members. The governor’s influence over the selection process is thus far greater than that of the attorney commissioners.
By exerting authority at multiple points, the governor is in the
247
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driver’s seat. In contrast, the attorney commissioners—and certainly the individual attorneys who elect them—play a relatively
diminished role. That role is certainly less powerful than that of
an entire primary or presidential electorate, which are the exclusionary systems Lund compares with merit selection.249 The governor’s final appointment may be constrained by preliminary appointive steps, but, contrary to Lund’s assertions of the governor’s
relative powerlessness,250 the state’s chief executive is still the
most powerful force in a merit-selection system.
That is not necessarily less true in Kansas than it is in Missouri.
The governor appoints three of seven commissioners under the
Missouri Plan, while the governor appoints four of nine under the
Kansas system.251 In Kansas, commission-approved nominees
need only a single attorney’s support for submission to the governor. Lund’s contention that the bar controls the entire selection
process relies on the unstated premise that the bar-selected commissioners will tend to vote in concert—something Lund gives no
evidence to support. Indeed, the available evidence is to the contrary.252 Regardless, the functional differences between the Missouri
and Kansas systems do not seem substantial.
Even if it were the case that the governor had very little discretion, merit selection’s constitutionality would probably be unaffected. There was no final appointment by an elected official in
Rodriguez, and yet the Court still upheld the interim-appointments
law in that case. If the entire process is not electoral but appointive, the question then becomes whether the appointive process
falls within the Rodriguez rule.
b) Merit-selection appointments fall within the Rodriguez
rule. Lund reads the Rodriguez holding narrowly. Although the

249 See supra Part II.A for a discussion of merit selection’s dissimilarities to those
electoral mediating institutions to which the Supreme Court has traditionally applied
strict scrutiny.
250 See Lund, supra note 3, at 1050.
251 Compare MO. CONST. art. V, §§ 25–27 (explaining Missouri’s model), with Dool,
2010 WL 3724660, at *1 (explaining Kansas’s model).
252 My request under the Kansas Open Records Act returned information showing
that attorneys of the state’s Supreme Court Nominating Commission do not tend to vote
in unison. Voting records of the individual commissioners date back to 2016, when the
commission became a public body under Kansas statute. Since 2016, the commission has
approved nine judicial candidates, all of whom received at least two votes from nonattorney commissioners. Only one candidate received unanimous approval from all five attorney commissioners, but that candidate was also unanimously approved by the four nonattorney commissioners. Letter from the Clerk of the App. Cts. of the Kan. Jud. Branch to
Zachary Reger, (Aug. 24, 2021), https://perma.cc/XXJ8-2VXN.
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case established that appointments are not automatically invalid
if made by an unelected person or body, he says it “does not stand
for the [ ] general proposition that appointments to public office
can be delegated to any group that seems reasonably (or even exceptionally) well qualified to make good appointments.”253 Rather,
Lund argues that Rodriguez represents an unusual departure
from the Sailors norm, under which appointments are made by
ordinary elected officials. In Rodriguez, Lund says, the Court engaged in a “fact-intensive analysis” in which the interim nature
of the appointment, its party-neutral application, and the specific
concern for maintaining balance in the Puerto Rican legislature
were adequate to ensure the law’s constitutionality.254 However,
these factors do not apply in the case of merit selection, Lund argues, where appointments are not interim in nature and “do not
fill an office to which the departed incumbent had been elected in
a one person, one vote election.”255 And perhaps most importantly,
Lund says, merit selection is far from neutral in application. Rather, it “entrenches the power of a discrete special interest group,
namely the state’s lawyers.”256
First, merit selection does involve interim (or “probationary”)
appointments, contrary to Lund’s assertions.257 As the judges are
the ones exercising “general governmental power”—and the commissioners themselves can only be said, if at all, to exercise such
power indirectly—the proper frame of review is not whether the
commissioners are selected on an interim basis but whether the
judges are. Merit-selection systems do not select judges for full
terms but rather appoint judges for relatively brief, interim vacancies whenever a sitting judge happens to retire, die in office,
lose a retention election, or be removed via the impeachment process. These terms are therefore far from uniform; their lengths,
like the interim term in Rodriguez, depend upon the random
chance of vacancy.
As in Rodriguez, the interim appointments facilitate the voters’ will. Under the Missouri Plan, after a newly appointed judge’s
first year in office, the judge must stand for retention in the next
253

Lund, supra note 3, at 1057.
Id. at 1056–57.
255 Id. at 1058.
256 Id.
257 See Glenn R. Winters, The Merit Plan for Judicial Selection and Tenure—Its Historical Development, 7 DUQ. L. REV. 61, 65–66 (1968) (referring to the time between a
merit-selection judge’s initial appointment and first retention election as a “probationary
period”).
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general election.258 Appellate judges then stand for retention
every twelve years thereafter.259 This establishes a sort of trial
period for new judges before they receive the approval of the electorate. Because Rodriguez was based in large part on the legislature’s reasonable belief that its chosen method of interim selection would more accurately reflect the will of the people until a
new general election could be held,260 merit selection, too, can be
justified under this same rationale. In merit-selection states, it is
reasonable to believe that voters have an expectation that judicial
vacancies will be filled by meritorious and qualified interim appointees until voters have the opportunity to weigh in. After all,
in most of these states, it is voters who initially enacted the meritselection plan. When the voters directly weigh in through a retention vote, they have at least one year’s worth of judicial experience
with which they can assess the newly appointed judge. The meritselection process, like the interim-appointments law in Rodriguez,
facilitates rather than thwarts the voters’ will. And the commission only has a hand in determining the appointee for a brief interim term; voters get the final say about whether that judge is
allowed a full twelve-year term.
Second, Lund misconstrues the neutral-application principle
of the Rodriguez Court. The law at issue in that case had a partyneutral application, which the Court pointed to in upholding it.261
The law applied to any vacancy in the state legislature. The law
still served to entrench the institutional interests of the state’s
political parties as exclusionary organizations that influenced the
selection of government officials; it allowed them to hold internal
elections for a replacement legislator rather than resorting to a
general election open to any qualified voter. Likewise, merit selection applies to any judicial vacancy, whenever one happens to
arise. Incumbent judges receive direct voter approval via retention elections. When a voter-approved judge leaves the bench, an
interim appointment provides a qualified replacement via the
same process until the judge can be fully approved by voters. The
system may entrench the institutional interests of the legal profession, but not to any greater extent than the Rodriguez law entrenched the institutional interests of political parties.

258
259
260
261

MO. CONST. art. V, § 25(c)(1).
MO. CONST. art. V, § 19.
Rodriguez, 457 U.S. at 13.
Id. at 10.

292

The University of Chicago Law Review

[89:1

Indeed, the supposed entrenchment is less substantial. Attorneys in Missouri Plan states may only vote for a small number of
commissioners who themselves exercise only a minority of votes
for a slate of judicial candidates from which the governor makes
the final selection. A state party in Puerto Rico, on the other hand,
exercises complete control over the election of a replacement
legislator.262 It may completely exclude nonparty members from
the selection process without constitutional issue. Merit selection is
more democratically responsive, as it guarantees Kramer-adherent
political input at multiple steps.
Regardless, merit selection does not violate the Kramer principle for the same general reason that the Puerto Rican law does
not: it is a political innovation, fitting within the republican tradition, that is designed to enhance democratic values. Specifically, merit selection takes aim at judicial corruption, ensures the
promotion of only meritorious judges, and depoliticizes the state
judiciary. The Rodriguez Court held that, “[a]bsent some clear
constitutional limitation, Puerto Rico is free to structure its political system to meet its ‘special concerns and political circumstances.’” 263 So are merit-selection states.
3. The judicial exception.
The exact scope of the judicial exception is unclear, but it
probably encompasses merit selection of state judges. In Wells,
the Supreme Court summarily affirmed a district court opinion
that held that the “one person, one vote” principle was inapplicable to judicial elections.264 However, as Lund notes, “[s]ummary
affirmances merely ‘prevent lower courts from coming to opposite
conclusions on the precise issues presented and necessarily decided by those actions.’” 265 The precise issue decided in Wells,
Lund says, “was whether direct elections to multi-member courts
must comply with the vote-dilution rulings in the Reynolds line of
cases.”266 But just because the judicial exception does not encompass merit selection by binding precedential force does not mean it
cannot include merit selection under a logical purposive extension.
262

See id. at 3–4.
Id. at 13–14 (quoting Garcia v. Barcelo, 671 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1982)).
264 Wells, 347 F. Supp. at 454 (“[T]he concept of one-man, one-vote apportionment
does not apply to the judicial branch of the government.”).
265 Lund, supra note 3, at 1058 (emphasis in original) (quoting Mandel v. Bradley,
432 U.S. 173, 176–77 (1977) (per curiam)).
266 Id. (citing Wells, 347 F. Supp. at 454).
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The Court recognized the Wells holding in Chisom, a case concerning a claim under the Voting Rights Act of 1965,267 but it declined to adopt the specific reasoning of the Wells district court.268
Section 2(a) of the Voting Rights Act prohibits any voting procedure that “results in a denial or abridgement of the right . . . to
vote on account of race or color,” while Section 2(b) describes the
test as whether, “based on the totality of the circumstances,” minority voters “have less opportunity than other members of the
electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.”269 Five judges of the Louisiana Supreme
Court were elected from single-member districts, while the remaining two judges were elected at-large from a multimember
district.270 The Chisom plaintiffs, Black voters in the multimember district, claimed this scheme violated Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act.271
The Chisom Court first had to decide whether Section 2 applied at all. The Court looked to Wells, in which the district court
reasoned that “judges and prosecutors are not representatives in
the same sense as are legislators or the executive” because “[t]heir
function is to administer the law, not to espouse the cause of a
particular constituency.”272 The Chisom Court, however, concluded
that the use of the word “representatives” in Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act did not make the section inapplicable to elected judges
absent further evidence of such an intent by Congress.273 The
Chisom Court thus applied Section 2 to the Louisiana judicial districting scheme even though the Wells Court thought that same
scheme did not violate the “one person, one vote” principle.274
Lund errs in concluding that Chisom constitutes a “rejection
of the reasoning in the Wells district court opinion.”275 The two
cases employed distinct interpretive schemas, one textual and the
other purposive, to answer two entirely different questions. The
term “representative” is not found in the Equal Protection Clause

267

52 U.S.C. §§ 10101–10702.
Chisom, 501 U.S. at 403.
269 Id. at 394–95 (quoting Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, 96 Stat. 134 (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10301)).
270 Id. at 384.
271 Id. at 384–85.
272 Wells, 347 F. Supp. at 455 (quoting Stokes v. Fortson, 234 F. Supp. 575, 577 (N.D.
Ga. 1964)).
273 Chisom, 501 U.S. at 396.
274 Id. at 404.
275 Lund, supra note 3, at 1059.
268
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itself, but is derived from case law, where it appears alongside
the type of purposivist evidence that the Court found lacking in
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.276 It is more accurate to say that
the Chisom Court—realizing interpretation of the Voting Rights
Act required a substantially different inquiry than interpretation
of the Court’s own equal protection jurisprudence—determined
that the Wells reasoning was inapplicable to the case before it.
Yet even the Chisom Court seemed to think it decisive that the
judges at issue were selected via contested popular elections on a
district level, just as other representatives are.277 Merit-selection
judges are of an entirely different breed. Unlike elected judges,
merit-selection judges are quite purposely insulated from public
pressures in ways traditional “representatives” are not. And
although some members of a merit-selection commission could be
said to represent specific districts within a state, the judges they
select generally have no specific electoral or appointive connection to any subset of the area that falls under their jurisdiction.
In creating such an insulated judiciary, a merit-selection state establishes judgeships that are supposed to be nonrepresentative.
Even if elected judges of the type scrutinized in Wells and Chisom
are representatives in the equal protection sense, merit-selection
judges still would not be. The use of retention elections in merit
selection does not alter this crucial difference because retention
deals only with absolute voter approval of a candidate running
unopposed, not voter selection of a preferred representative. In
other words, the judicial exception is an even better fit for merit
selection than it is for the very case from which it initially arose.
C. Kramer Is Inapplicable Under an Implicit Exception
The Kramer line of cases was never meant to prohibit reasonable alternatives to traditional methods of judicial selection.278
Rather, these cases were intended to ensure the equal protection
of voters in selecting their elected representatives in the political
branches of government. The language of the “one person, one

276 See, e.g., Kramer, 395 U.S. at 626 (“Any unjustified discrimination in determining
who may participate in political affairs or in the selection of public officials undermines
the legitimacy of representative government.”).
277 See Chisom, 501 U.S. at 401.
278 See Sailors, 387 U.S. at 110–11 (“Viable local governments may need many innovations, numerous combinations of old and new devices, great flexibility in municipal arrangements to meet changing urban conditions. We see nothing in the Constitution to
prevent experimentation.”).
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vote” line of cases bears this foundational understanding,279 which
was recognized by the Wells district court in a case specifically
pertaining to judicial selection.280 Regardless of Wells’s limited
precedential value, the purpose of these cases—to ensure fair and
equal participation of voters in political, as opposed to administrative and judicial, governmental processes—should weigh heavily on the future jurisprudence of federal courts. Equal protection
should not become a constitutional “straitjacket” on state sovereignty and experimentation.281
As VanOstran282 and Judge O’Brien283 note, the recognized exceptions to Kramer cannot be exhaustive.284 Even if merit selection
does not fall within a recognized exception, it is still constitutional
by way of an implicit exception—meaning that a merit-selection
process does not trigger application of the “one person, one vote”
framework at all. As a result, it should only be subject to rational
basis review. The bounds of Kramer are a poor fit for merit selection, a unique mechanism substantially dissimilar to the electoral
systems to which “one person, one vote” has traditionally been
applied. And as VanOstran argues, both Kramer and merit selection foster stronger democratic systems by promoting political
participation.285
Regardless, the state legislatures, executives, and—in many
states—the initiative-petition process serve as political checks on
any potential “impermissible delegation of [ ] governmental powers that generally affect all of the people to a body with a selective
electorate.”286 If the people become dissatisfied with merit selection, they maintain the power, either directly or through their
elected representatives, to adopt an alternative system. The corruption of such a political check was one of the reasons the Court
established the “one person, one vote” principle for representative
bodies in the first place.287 With legislative malapportionment, the
279 See Kramer, 395 U.S. at 629 (holding that strict scrutiny is applicable where, in
an election for a governmental body exercising “legislative” power, “some resident citizens
are permitted to participate and some are not”).
280 Wells, 347 F. Supp. at 454–56.
281 See Ball, 451 U.S. at 363 n.5 (quoting Avery, 390 U.S. at 485); see also Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 473 (1991) (holding that Missouri’s mandatory retirement age for
state judges does not violate the Equal Protection Clause).
282 See VanOstran, supra note 208, at 175.
283 See Dool, 497 F. App’x at 788 (O’Brien, J., concurring).
284 See Hadley, 397 U.S. at 56.
285 VanOstran, supra note 208, at 176–77.
286 Ball, 451 U.S. at 373 (Powell, J., concurring).
287 Id. (citing Baker, 369 U.S. at 258–59 (Clark, J., concurring)).
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legislators themselves design the system that perpetuates their
power, necessitating judicial intervention. But when it comes to
merit selection, there is no such worry. Attorney power in merit
selection extends to the vetting of judicial candidates, not to the
perpetuation of merit selection itself. The henhouse is not
guarded by foxes.
III. MERIT SELECTION IS AN INVALUABLE INNOVATION
Merit selection is not simply constitutional. It is a crucial tool
for constructing superior judicial systems. This Part examines the
policy implications of the Missouri Plan. Part III.A begins with a
discussion of the bigger picture and contextualizes the debate
over merit selection as part of a larger dispute about long-term
versus short-term democratic values. Part III.B then explains
why merit selection promotes judicial values in a way that other
selection methods do not, specifically through its focus on meritocratic—as opposed to political—accountability.
A. Merit Selection Promotes Long-Term Democratic Values
The movement against merit selection is often framed in prodemocratic terms.288 Yet sometimes the best way to promote the
will of the people is to allow voters to constrain their own future
discretion or the discretion of their elected leaders.289 This is the
key principle of constitution making, the process through which
most merit-selection systems arose.290 Constitutions are not antithetical to democracy but a vital part of a long-term democratic
strategy. A focus on rank democracy above all else can lead to
subversion of the public will, as occurred with the corruption of
judicial elections in early-1900s Missouri.291 Contested judicial
elections allow the people to voice their opinion on specific candidates, but they may subvert the broader will of the people by pre-

288 See Taylor, supra note 48 (describing the choice between merit selection and judicial election as a choice between selection by the “best people” and selection by “we the
people”).
289 Cf. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 10–15 (1971) (explaining the concept of the
“veil of ignorance”). When Missouri voters first ratified the Missouri Plan in 1940, they
stood behind a sort of veil of ignorance. They did not know the specific judges that the Plan
would produce, but they collectively determined that a merit system would better promote
a “just” judiciary than would contested elections of known candidates.
290 See Philip L. Dubois, The Politics of Innovation in State Courts: The Merit Plan of
Judicial Selection, 20 PUBLIUS 23, 28 (1990).
291 See supra Part I.A.1.
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venting the judiciary from being the type of institution the electorate desires it to be. An appointment-confirmation system does
not always fare much better. The voters’ derivative control over
gubernatorial appointments is often illusory,292 and if the voters
desire a nonpartisan judiciary (as they continually say they do),293
handing partisan officials complete control over judicial selection
is a poor way to achieve it.
For this reason, opponents of merit selection err in classifying
it as elitist and undemocratic. By preventing a single political faction from gaining unfettered control over judicial selection, merit
selection bolsters long-term democratic legitimacy. By balancing
political accountability with insulated legal expertise, the Missouri
Plan ensures that courts can remain largely independent arbiters
of legal disputes—something the alternative methods of contested
judicial election and appointment-confirmation, which feature
more simplistic political input, cannot adequately accomplish.
The public has expressed its desire for a meritorious, noncorrupt,
and apolitical judiciary. Merit selection is the tool voters have
chosen to best implement this higher vision.
The Missouri Plan is not perfect. No process can truly eliminate partisan and interest-group influence while retaining meaningful democratic accountability.294 But merit selection—with its
multilayered deliberative process; dispersal of power among commissioners, the governor, and voters; and atmosphere of legal professionalism—is the least political method of judicial selection.295

292

Rodriguez, 457 U.S. at 12.
For example, consider responses from the 2019 Annenberg Civics Knowledge Survey, which asked 1,104 U.S. adults what factors they considered important in electing a
state or local judge. Of those, 89% said that it was essential or very important that the
candidate will “make rulings based on the facts of the case, the law, and the Constitution.”
Further, 87% said that it was essential or very important that the candidate is “fair and
impartial.” In contrast, only 35% said that it was essential or very important that the
candidate “[s]hare[s] their political beliefs.” Most Americans Trust the Supreme Court, but
Think It Is ‘Too Mixed Up in Politics’, ANNENBERG PUB. POL’Y CTR. (Oct. 16, 2019),
https://perma.cc/JYR6-8Z2V.
294 See generally Bunch & Casey, supra note 54 (explaining how, from 1972 to 1990,
the process of judicial selection in Missouri became more overtly political than in the early
days of the Missouri Plan). See also RICHARD A. WATSON & RONDAL G. DOWNING, THE
POLITICS OF THE BENCH AND THE BAR: JUDICIAL SELECTION UNDER THE MISSOURI
NONPARTISAN COURT PLAN 6 (1969) (studying the operation of the first few decades of the
Missouri Plan and concluding that it has neither “eliminated political forces from the selection of judges” nor handed “lawyers representing the affluent and prestigious institutions in society” the ability to “decide who will sit on the bench”).
295 See generally Stith & Root, supra note 47.
293
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B. Merit Selection Promotes Judicial Independence and
Accountability
Commentators often frame the choice of a selection mechanism in light of the seemingly competing goals of judicial independence and judicial accountability.296 A judge is independent
when she is unbeholden to outside forces. A truly independent
judge can exercise her best legal judgment without fear of the political, social, and economic consequences. An accountable judge,
on the other hand, is held responsible for improper use of her judicial authority. Accountability can occur both ex ante and ex post.
The former encompasses the vetting that occurs during the selection process itself, while the latter includes retention and recall
elections as well as impeachment proceedings. These two values
are generally viewed as conflicting—the more independent the judiciary, the less accountable, and vice versa.
Opponents of merit selection generally concede that it produces an independent judiciary, but they argue that this only occurs at the cost of a suitable level of judicial accountability. However, merit-selection opponents fixate on political accountability,
even though this is not all that merit selection is designed to protect. A judge chosen through merit selection, they argue, is not
carefully vetted by political actors because her appointment is not
subject to a general election or legislative confirmation and because
the governor is severely constrained in exercising his appointive
judgment.297 This results in courts that are unaccountable to the
people and their elected representatives, they conclude.298
But these critics ignore the meritocratic accountability that
merit selection introduces, both ex ante and ex post. The selection
process itself uses the judgment of legal experts to carefully vet a
candidate’s legal acumen. By court rule, the entire process must
focus on meritocratic concerns. In Missouri, candidate interviews
are conducted in open meetings, providing a public check on the

296 See O’Connor, supra note 6, at 483 (“[T]hose who would offer you the false choice
between an independent and an accountable judiciary shoulder the burden of rebutting
. . . the long-held ideal that a judge’s sole concern must be the law.”).
297 See Schneider, supra note 206, at 632–60.
298 See Owen L. Heggs, Merit Selection of the Ohio Judiciary: An Analysis of S.J.R. 6
and a Proposal for Implementation, 28 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 628, 637–41 (1978) (summarizing and collecting arguments of merit-selection opponents).
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process.299 But this evaluative process does not end once the candidate assumes a seat on the bench. In this regard, Missouri is
again a representative model. In its current state, the Missouri
Plan includes an independent committee that conducts a judicialperformance review of all judges who will face retention. These
evaluations—which are freely available online300—review a
judge’s courtroom conduct, the clarity of her written opinions, and
her “impartiality/fairness” according to attorneys, among other
metrics.301 Voters take these performance reviews seriously. In
2020, the chairman of the committee noted that hundreds of thousands of Missourians had viewed the evaluations over the previous four years.302 Additionally, judges who received more negative
reviews were more likely to fail retention or receive fewer retention votes.303 Because judges in these retention elections run unopposed and with no partisan affiliation, voters are freed from
their usual political allegiances to evaluate incumbent judges primarily on judicial performance. The result is not only a depoliticized judiciary, but a system that actively rewards more capable
judges.304
The judiciary is and ought to be an apolitical branch. As the
Wells district court noted, judges are not representatives of the
people but neutral arbiters of the law.305 U.S. Supreme Court Justices, at the pinnacle of the legal profession, claim to be apolitical

299 Even if we are hesitant to entrust unelected experts with decision-making power,
the ability to review their work creates a safeguard against abuse. This principle undergirds much of federal administrative law, in which procedural requirements for agency
action allow nonexpert political officials to engage in meaningful oversight. See JOHN F.
MANNING & MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION AND REGULATION 704 (3d ed. 2017)
(describing the concept of “fire alarm” oversight, which allows political actors to respond
to a public signal that something is wrong). Likewise, an open process within a meritselection system allows nonexpert voters and the governor to engage in meaningful oversight through their respective roles in the selection process.
300 See Reviews, YOURMISSOURIJUDGES, https://perma.cc/XP6J-79JF.
301 See, e.g., 2020 Appellate Court Evaluation—Lawyer Survey, Judge: Kurt S.
Odenwald, MO. BAR ASSOC., https://perma.cc/3NMZ-563L.
302 Alisa Nelson, On the Election Ballot: 53 Missouri Judges Who Want to Keep Their
Jobs, MISSOURINET (Oct. 8, 2020), https://perma.cc/Y5JB-W75H.
303 See Missouri Local Trial Court Judicial Elections, 2016, BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Missouri_local_trial_court_judicial_elections,_2016#Judicial
_evaluations (follow the hyperlink for each judge’s name; then compare evaluations and
election results).
304 The promotion of meritocratic judges is particularly vital at the state and local
levels, where talent pools are smaller than at the federal level.
305 See Wells, 347 F. Supp. at 454; see also O’Connor, supra note 6, at 483 (explaining
that “a judge’s sole concern must be the law”).
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actors.306 Even if such claims are false, they demonstrate the existence of a pervasive notion that judges should be above politics.
As such, it is inappropriate for judicial accountability to depend too
heavily on political as opposed to meritocratic forces. The Missouri
Plan eases the tension between independence and accountability.
It prioritizes meritocratic accountability, a specific type of accountability that is both more suitable for judicial selection and that
does not come at the expense of judicial independence. Consequently, when compared to alternative systems of judicial selection, merit selection best achieves the most important structural
values of a judicial system.
CONCLUSION
Although the Missouri Plan primarily arose as a counter to the
detrimental effects of contested judicial elections, supporters and
critics have noted that its continued operation has many laudable goals, including promoting meritorious jurists,307 reducing
judicial corruption,308 depoliticizing the judiciary and the judicialselection process,309 increasing judicial legitimacy,310 and ensuring
judicial independence.311 Since its inception in 1940, merit selection has become an entrenched aspect of many states’ constitutional structures—one that is valid under the U.S. Constitution
by many different routes. Not only does the Missouri Plan satisfy
each of the three recognized exceptions to the Kramer principle,
but it also clearly falls within an implicit exception as well.
Yet merit selection is far from safe. In short order, the equal
protection challenge to merit selection has found a foothold in
both legal academia and the federal judiciary. The trendline is
worrying. Despite its continued success, merit selection faces increasing attacks—both political and legal—from those who view
it as antithetical to the idea of self-government.

306 See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, THE AUTHORITY OF THE COURT AND THE PERIL OF
POLITICS 62 (2021) (“[I]t is wrong to think of the Court as a political institution,” but “to
suggest a total and clean divorce between the Court and politics is not quite right either.”);
Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Says Judges Are Above Politics. It May Hear a Case Testing
That View., N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2019), https://perma.cc/N3CP-5NWU.
307 See Daugherty, supra note 11, at 339.
308 See id.
309 See O’Connor, supra note 6, at 486.
310 Id. at 486, 489.
311 Stith & Root, supra note 47, at 725–50.
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The opponents of merit selection, however, have it backward.
Merit selection is neither elitist nor undemocratic. By counterbalancing political influence over judicial selection with the staid
judgment of legal experts, the Missouri Plan ensures that state
courts remain independent of partisan and interest-group capture. This good-government reform increases rather than stymies
democratic legitimacy; it restores rather than subverts public faith
in the institutions of government. In an era of democratic backsliding, partisan polarization, and increasing distrust of public institutions, merit selection is more important than ever before.

